A espontaneidade da consciência como fundamento ontológico da liberdade em Sartre

Abstract

This dissertation focuses on the theme of spontaneity from the phenomenological principle of unreflective consciousness in its purity and original impersonality in the works of the young Sartre. It begins trying to understand a negative contrast between spontaneity and inertia in his propaedeutic works to Being and nothingness, through the nihilated framing opposition between the two regions of Being. In its ontology, Sartrean phenomenology establishes pure spontaneity or conscious as the foundation of freedom, central concept of Existentialism. Pure or conscious spontaneity prevails over will as an important feature of the For-Itself in a deliberative organization of freedom. The principle of freedom, therefore, is emerging from a contradiction between will and spontaneity, in a predominance of the unreflective over the reflective